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The Application of Labor and Antitrust
Laws to Physician Unions: The Need for
A Re-Evaluation of Traditional Concepts
In a Radically Changing Field
By C1AI mES B. CkAvER*
The character of [medical] practice is changing under many
pressures. The higher costs of medical care have given great
incentive to prepayment. The increase in medical knowledge and
new techniques have created specialties and heightened interde-
pendence among doctors, and. . . more and more specialists and
general practitioners have joined in group practice arrangements.
The need for expensive equipment makes individual entrepreneur-
ship difficult so that hospitals, groups of doctors, and consumer
organizations able to supply the needed capital have hired doctors,
sometimes on a salaried basis. The traditional practice where a
doctor works alone and charges a fee for each service rendered is
being challenged by all these developments ....
By encouraging and promoting such changes, labor comes into con-
flict with the officials of organized medicine. .. .
Introduction
The relationship which traditionally existed between a private
physician and the hospital where he practiced his profession was gener-
ally attenuated. The hospital merely provided the facilities which en-
abled the practitioner to treat his patients;2 the physician was solely
responsible for the medical service he provided. "A hospital had neither
* B.S., 1967, Cornell University; M. Indus. & Labor Rel., 1968, Cornell Univer-
sity School of Industrial and Labor Relations; J.D., 1971, University of Michigan.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida; Member, California Bar.
1. R. MuNTs, BARGArNiNG FOR HEALTH 144 (1967). For a discussion of the
strong opposition historically advanced by the American Medical Association to modifi-
cations in traditional forms of practice, see Comment, The American Medical Associa-
tions: Power, Purpose and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE LJ. 938 (1954).
2. Comment, The Hospital and the Staff Physician-An Expanding Duty of
Care, 7 C .GHTON L. REV. 249 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Staff Physician].
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the right nor the ability to practice medicine and was, therefore, incapa-
ble of supervising the physician who utilized its facilities but operated as
an independent contractor." 3 In recent years, however, the once sacro-
sanct independent doctor-hospital relationship has changed markedly.
Such an institution is no longer a mere building where private prac-
titioners of medicine care for their private patients. Rather, the
community hospital as a corporate institution is being called upon
to assume the role of a comprehensive health center ultimately
responsible for arranging and co-ordinating total health care. 4
Lately, the once wholly independent medical practitioner has suf-
fered a substantial diminution in his individual authority. He has found
it necessary to deal with the well organized and powerful health insur-
ance industry which today pays for over two-thirds of the nation's
medical expenses.5 The physician has become increasingly dependent
upon the hospital, as membership on the staff of a health care institution
has come to be a prerequisite to a full and successful practice for most
physicians. 6 A pervasive increase in the extent of control which health
care institutions exert over their professional staff members has, how-
ever, accompanied such staff privileges. Although some of the impetus
for the proliferation of hospital controls has been self-generated,7 exter-
nal developments have more significantly affected and altered the physi-
cian-health care institution relationship.
Medicare 8 and Medicaid9 programs, fostered by federal legislation,
3. Id.; see Moon v. Mercy Hosp., 150 Colo. 430, 373 P.2d 944 (1962); Purcell v.
Poor Sisters of St. Francis Seraph, 147 Colo. 478, 364 P.2d 184 (1961).
4. Southwick, The Hospital As an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities
Change Its Relationship With the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. WESr. L. REV. 429 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Southwick]. "The hospital, once nothing more than a hotel for the
sick, has become an integral part of the healing process." Staff Physician, supra note 2,
at 249; see Fabro, Legal Relationship of Physician to Hospital, 43 CONN. BJ. 418
(1969); Mueller, The Expanding Duty of the Hospital to the Patient, 47 NEB. L. Rv.
337 (1968).
5. Wall Street Journal, July 5, 1972, at 7, col. 1.
6. Southwick, supra note 4, at 453.
7. See, e.g., AMEPicAN HosPrrAL ASSOCIATION, PATTENrS BiL. OF IGHTS 1
(1972). The preamble recognizes the medical responsibility which a hospital owes to its
patient. Such a novel approach necessitates the imposition of quality control mechanisms
by hospitals over the medical care provided by staff physicians if they are to fulfill their
overall obligation to the patients. See Southwick, supra note 4, at 434.
8. Medicare was established by the 1965 amendments to the Social Security Act
for the purpose of providing health insurance for the aged. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-9511
(1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973). Part A of the program covers hospital costs (42
U.S.C. §§ 1395 c to i - 2 (1970 & Supp. II, 1973)), while part B generally pertains to
the costs of physician services and certain ancillary expenses (42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j-w
1970 & Supp. III, 1973)). See generally Wolkstein, Medicare 1971: Changing Attitudes
and Changing Legislation, 35 L. & CoNTEMP. PRon. 697 (1970).
9. Medicaid concerns the Grants to States for Medical Assistance Program which
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have begun to have a considerable impact upon the independence of
doctors practicing at hospitals. Each hospital which provides health care
services to Medicare patients must have a utilization review committee
which is required to supervise and review the necessity and propriety of
medical services furnished to those patients.' 0 This requirement forces
hospitals to exercise a far greater degree of control over their staff
physicians than has previously been exerted. Additional Medicare and
Medicaid requirements will further erode the traditional professional
independence of medical practitioners.
The Social Security Amendments of 197211 require the establish-
ment of Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) which
will be responsible for carefully monitoring the medical care provided to
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. 12 PSROs will ultimately be re-
quired to oversee the quality and nature of medical care which physi-
cians and hospitals accord to their many Medicare and Medicaid pa-
tients.13 The same 1972 enactment also provides strong impetus for
the creation of large group medical practices which will further diminish
the ability of private practitioners to maintain their historical individuali-
ty and independence.
During the past few years there has been a significant decline in the
number of practitioners who have continued the tradition of individual-
was enacted "[flor the purpose of enabling each State . . . to furnish (1) medical
assistance on behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled
individuals . . . and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help such families and
individuals attain or retain capability for independence of self-care ." 42 U.S.C. §
1396 (Supp. I1, 1973). Such programs must be established by individual states, and must
satisfy federal requirements to be eligible to receive matching funds. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a-
b (1970). See generally Stevens & Stevens, Medicaid: Anatomy of a Dilemma, 35 L. &
CoNTEMp. PROB. 348 (1970).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(e)(6), x(k) (1970 & Supp. I1, 1973). Many private
insurance contract arrangements and some state hospital licensure statutes similarly
require such hospital utilization review committees. See Southwick, supra note 4, at 429.
11. §§ 101-413, 86 Stat. 1329.
12. Id. § 249F, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4 (Supp. III, 1973). See Southwick, supra note
4, at 429. Local PSROs may elect to have hospital utilization review committees act as
the initial reviewing bodies. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(e) (Supp. I1, 1973).
13. See generally, Flasnor, Reed, Coburn, & Fine, Professional Standards Review
Organizations: Analysis of Their Development and Implementation Based on a Prelimi-
nary Review of the Hospital Admission and Surveillance Program in Illinois, 223
J.A.M.A. 1473 (1973); Note, Federally Imposed Self-Regulation of Medical Practice: A
Critique of the Professional Standards Review Organization, 42 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 822
(1974).
The AMA has strongly opposed the PSRO legislation because of the fact that it will
require doctors to conform to pre-established professional norms, rather than to tradi-
tional individual judgment. See, e.g., A.M.A. News, July 2/9, 1973, at 6, col. 1.
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ized practice, and a commensurate proliferation of well organized group
practices. 4 The phenomenal success of many of these group programs
has frequently been associated with their innovative willingness to pro-
vide guaranteed medical care on a set fee, prepayment basis to sub-
scribing patients.' 5 The rapid expansion of such group practice prepay-
ment plans is certain to continue, since one of the sections of the Social
Security Amendments of 197216 authorizes the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare to enter into contractual arrangements with
qualified group health programs (health maintenance organizations)
under which they will be reimbursed for providing health care to Medi-
care recipients on a per capita prepayment basis."' Furthermore, the
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 197318 requires all employers
who are subject to the federal minimum wage law'9 and who employ
at least twenty-five employees per calendar quarter to include in any
health benefit plan which they provider an option which will permit em-
ployees to choose to be included in a qualified health maintenance or-
ganization if one exists in the geographical area.20  These health care
14. Comment, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care
Crisis, 84 HRv. L. REv. 887, 903 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Prepaid Group Practice].
See also Hansen, Laws Affecting Group Health Plans, 35 IowA L. REv. 209 (1950).
15. The most successful integrated prepayment health care program has been the
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan which currently has over 2,000,000 members. Prepaid
Group Practice, supra note 14, at 911; see Gerstel & Du Bois, The Medical Care
Program of the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, in HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS: STUDIES
IN ORGANIATIONAL DivERsrry 292 (1970). For a history of the Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan during its formative years, see KAISER FOUNDATION MEDICAL CARE PROGRAM ANN.
REP. 2-10 (1960). The prepayment Group Health Association plan of Washington, D.C.,
with over 73,000 subscribers, is also well known. See Prepaid Group Practice, supra note
14, at 913 & n.67. See also Phelan, Erickson, & Fleming, Group Practice Prepayment:
An Approach to Delivering Organized Health Services, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 796
(1970).
16. Social Security Amendment of 1972, § 226, 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (Supp. III,
1973). The HMO legislation was part of the pervasive Social Security Amendments of
1972. §§ 101-413, 86 Stat. 1329; see Note, Federally Imposed Self-Regulation of Medical
Practice: A Critique of the Professional Standards Review Organization, 42 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 822, 823-24 n.5 (1974).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (Supp. III, 1973); see Stem, Health Care Expansion:
Provisions of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
89 (1974). See also Holley & Carlson, The Legal Context for the Development of
Health Maintenance Organizations, 24 STAN. L. REv. 644 (1972).
18. Act of Dec. 29, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, §§ 1-7, 87 Stat. 914.
19. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970), as amended
(Supp. 111, 1973).
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300e-9 (1974); see Stem, Health Care Expansion: Provisions of
the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 89-90
(1974). The 1973 enactment also allows the Secretary of Health Education and Welfare
to provide financial assistance to incipient health maintenance organizations.
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organizations will necessarily exercise a vital degree of control over the
physicians who provide the requisite medical services, as they will in-
volve extensive scrutiny by others of the propriety and nature of medi-
cal determinations.
In the future, physicians will be forced increasingly to deal with
large insurance carriers, hospital review boards, PSROs, and other
institutional organizations. Against such powerful groups, the individual
doctor is relatively helpless; he will be forced to accept the conditions of
the relationship unilaterally established by them21 or he will have to
forego meaningful opportunities for lucrative employment. Recognizing
the weakness inherent in their individual positions, doctors have begun
to appreciate the need to establish their own organizational strength.
22
Private physicians are now attempting to combat the strength of the
institutional Goliaths by forming and joining associations, guilds, and
even unions.23 Such organizational efforts, however, face significant
legal problems.
If traditional legal concepts pertaining to the status of physicians
are unthinkingly and anachronistically applied to the united endeavors
of all doctors, not only may the physicians be forced to forego the labor
relations rights and protections generally available to regular workers,24
but also they may be exposed to the risk of substantial antitrust liabili-
ty.25 However, in recognition of the radical evolutionary process per-
taining to modem medical relationships, "courts and legislatures
throughout the country have come to realize that traditional legal
analyses of these [doctor-hospital] relationships accord neither con-
21. When a physician elects to participate in an institutionalized program, his
independence must often be sacrificed to the efficient functioning of the organization.
See Prepaid Group Practice, supra note 14, at 947.
22. Although the American Medical Association (AMA) purports to represent the
interests of all physicians, many of the activist, organization-minded physicians believe
that it has thus far done relatively little to provide doctors with meaningful assistance
concerning their dealings with health care institutions. Furthermore, they are quite
skeptical regarding the possibility that the AMA will significantly alter its posture in the
future.
23. See, e.g., Am. Med. News, April 10, 1972, at 3; Am. Med. News, April 3,
1972, at 1; L.A. Times, Jan. 29, 1973, § 1, at 4, col. 6; Medical Economics, Jan. 3, 1972,
at 103; Medical Economics, July 17, 1972, at 57-61.
24. See text accompanying notes 29-92 infra.
25. See text accompanying notes 93-194 infra. See generally Comment, Private
Physician Unions: Federal Antitrust and Labor Law Implications, 20 U.C.LA.L REV.
983 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Physician Unions]. Although this comment explicated
the traditional legal concepts indigenous to organized action by physicians, it did not
meaningfully explore the possible ramifications incident to the evolutionary nature of the
modem status of doctors.
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temporary realities nor societal needs. ' 26  They have consequently
demonstrated a refreshing inclination to reconsider and modify signifi-
cantly many of the traditional legal doctrines relevant to the doctor-
hospital relationship. Although the enlightened developments in this
area have thus far been confined generally to the question of hospital
responsibility for the improper acts of staff physicians 2 7 there is no rea-
son why such innovative evaluative techniques should not be similarly
used to reassess other traditional attitudes concerning physicians and
health care institutions.
This article will explore traditional labor and antitrust concepts as
they apply to organized action by physicians28 and will suggest an
approach which would provide meaningful protection for modem-day
practitioners who require united strength, while simultaneously limiting
unconscionable interference with the rights of the general public.
Labor Law Considerations
NLRA Coverage
Since the enactment of the Wagner Act29 in 1935, workers em-
ployed by private employers have generally enjoyed significant labor law
protection. Nevertheless, until very recently, physicians employed by
private, nonprofit hospitals were not accorded the rights available to
other workers because the NLRA expressly excluded such health care
institutions from its coverage.30 On July 26, 1974, however, the presi-
26. Note, Independent Duty of a Hospital to Prevent Physicians' Malpractice, 15
ARXZ. L. REv. 953 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Malpractice].
27. See generally Hanson & Stromberg, Hospital Liability for Negligence, 21
HAsmos L.J. 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hanson & Stromberg]; Mueller, The
Expanding Duty of the Hospital to the Patient, 47 NEB. L. REV. 337 (1968); Southwick,
supra note 4; Southwick, The Hospital's New Responsibility, 17 CLLrv.-MAP. L. REV. 146
(1968); Southwick, The Law of Hospital Liability, in LEGAL MEDICiNE ANNUAL 91
(1970); Malpractice, supra note 5; Staff Physician, supra note 2; Note, Hospital Liability
for the Negligence of Physicians: Some Needed Legal Sutures, 26 U. FLA. L REV. 844
(1974); Comment, Liability of a Hospital for Negligent Acts of a Physician-Employee,
18 OxmL.A L. Rav. 77 (1965).
28. In addition to a consideration of federal labor and antitrust law, this article
will discuss relevant California legal principles. Discussion is limited to California law
because California coverage of these areas is fairly representative of state laws dealing
with these subjects, there has been substantial physician organizing in California, and
while in practice the author acted as counsel to a California-based physicians' union.
29. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 151-68 (1973 & Supp. 1975)).
30. NLRA section 2(2), 29 U.S.C. section 152(2) (1970), which defined those
employers subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRA, expressly excluded "any corporation
or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of
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dent signed Public Law 93-360, 31 which has the effect of extending the
coverage of the NLRA to all persons employed by private, nonprofit
hospitals."2 This occurrence may result in great benefits to doctors who
desire to organize.
Workers within the coverage of the NLRA are afforded funda-
mental benefits and protections. They "have the right to self-organiza-
tion, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection. . . -.1 Their employers may not interfere
with their exercise of these protected rights, 4 nor may their employers
discriminate against them as a result of their having exercised such
rights. 5 Furthermore, when a majority of the workers employed in an
appropriate bargaining unit designate or select a particular labor or-
any private shareholder or individual .... " But see notes 31-32 & accompanying text
infra.
It should also be noted that the NLRA has traditionally excluded from its coverage
all branches of the United States Government, as well as all states and political
subdivisions thereof. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970). See note 80 infra.
31. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395, amending 29 U.S.C.A. §§
151-68 (1973 & Supp. 1975).
32. The effective date of the amending legislation was August 25, 1974. The
enactment not only removed the private, nonprofit hospital exemption from section 2(2)
of the NLRA, but also added some further provisions dealing with such medical
facilities. See generally Guidelines Issued by the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board for use of Board Regional Offices in Unfair Labor Practices Cases
Arising Under the 1974 Nonprofit Hospital Amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, 86
LAB. Rr.L. REP. 371 (1974).
Prior to the 1974 amendments, doctors employed by private, proprietary hospitals
with gross annual revenues of at least $250,000, Butte Medical Hosp. Properties, 168
N.L.R.B. 266 (1967), private, proprietary nursing homes with gross annual revenues of
at least $100,000, University Nursing Home, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 263 (1967), or private,
nonprofit extended care nursing facilities with gross yearly income of at least $100,000,
Drexel Home, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1970), were under the jurisdiction of the
NLRA. The jurisdictional standard applicable with respect to private, proprietary hos-
pitals has been extended to private, nonprofit hospitals. East Oakland Community
Health Alliance, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. No. 193, 89 L.R.R.M. 1372 (1975).
33. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). That section also provides workers with
the concomitant "right to refrain from any or all of such activities." Id. See generally C.
Monius, THE DEvELoPiNG IABOR LAW (1971).
34. NLRA section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. section 158(a)(1) (1970): "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer - (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
35. NLRA section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. section 158(a)(3) (1970): "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer... (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discou-
rage membership in any labor organization... :'
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ganization36 as their exclusive representative,3 7 their employer is obli-
gated to negotiate in good faith with that organization concerning
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.3 8  In
order to avail themselves of the rights and protections provided by the
NLRA, however, physicians must be considered to be employees
within the meaning of that Act."
Since the original Wagner Act40 did not specifically define the term
"employee," the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or labor
board) was granted broad administrative discretion in its determina-
tion of the appropriate scope of NLRA coverage. The United States
Supreme Court recognized in NLRB v. Hearst Publications Inc.,41 that
traditional common law distinctions between employees and independ-
ent contractors were not mandatory:
The mischief at which the Act is aimed and the remedies it
offers are not confined exclusively to "employees" within the tra-
ditional legal distinctions separating them from "independent con-
tractors."...
Unless the common-law tests are to be imported and made ex-
clusively controlling, without regard to the statute's purposes, it
cannot be irrelevant that the particular workers [in question] are
subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the evils the statute was
designed to eradicate and that the remedies it affords are appro-
priate for preventing them or curing their harmful effects in the
special situation. Interruptions of commerce through strikes and
unrest may stem as well from labor disputes between some who,
36. NLRA section 2(5), 29 U.S.C. section 152(5) (1970), broadly defines "labor
organization" to include: "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." Any guild,
association, or union of physicians, therefore, would clearly be a "labor organization"
within the meaning of the NLRA. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
37. See NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
38. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer within the jurisdiction of the NLRA to fail to bargain collectively with the duly
designated representative of his employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970). See section
8(d) regarding the scope of the employer's negotiating obligation. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1970). See generally Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 248 (1964); Feinsinger, The National Labor Relations Act and Collective
Bargaining, 57 MicH. L. Rnv. 807 (1959); Fleming, New Challenges for Collective
Bargaining, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 426. See also Note, Collective Bargaining and the
Professional Employee, 69 COLuM. L. REv. 277 (1969).
39. Section 7 is expressly applicable only to "employees." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
Similarly, sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(5) only afford general protection to
"employees." See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (5), (d) (1970). See notes 34-35 supra.
40. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
41. 322U.S. 111 (1944).
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for other purposes, are technically "independent contractors" and
their employers as from disputes between persons who, for those
purposes, are "employees" and their employers. Inequality of bar-
gaming power in controversies over wages, hours, and working con-
ditions may as well characterize the status of the one group as of
the other. The former, when acting alone, may be as "helpless in
dealing with an employer," as "dependent. . .on his daily wage"
and as "unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and un-
fair treatment" as the latter. For each, "union . . . [may be]
essential to give . . . opportunity to deal on equality with their
employer." And for each, collective bargaining may be appropri-
ate and effective for the "friendly adjustment of industrial disputes
arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working con-
ditions." In short, when the particular situation of employment
combines these characteristics, so that the economic facts of the
relation make it more nearly one of employment than of independ-
ent business enterprise with respect to the ends sought to be
accomplished by the legislation, those characteristics may outweigh
technical legal classification for purposes unrelated to the statute's
objectives and bring the relation within its protections.
42
In 1947, the Eightieth Congress expressly rejected the policy ori-
ented analysis which had been adopted by the labor board and the
Supreme Court in Hearst Publications. The Taft-Hartley Ac4 amend-
ments to the NLRA modified the statutory definition of the term
employee expressly to exclude "any individual having the status of an
independent contractor." 44 By this statutory alteration, Congress clearly
indicated its intention that only the ordinary meaning of the term
employee comes within the coverage of the NLRA. The relevant legisla-
tive history pertaining to the 1947 enactment unequivocally demon-
strates that this change constituted a complete disavowal of 'the Hearst
Publications emphasis on economic and policy considerations. 45 The
Supreme Court has since recognized that when questions arise concern-
42. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 126-28 (1944) (citations
omitted). In Hearst Publications, the Supreme Court accepted the Labor Board's exten-
sion of NLRA's protection to independent newspaper sellers concerning their relationship
with the newspaper from which they obtained their papers.
43. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-87 (1970)).
44. Id. § 101, at 137-38; see section 2(3) of the NLRA which provides, in
pertinent part: "The term 'employee' shall include any employee ... but shall not
include . . . any individual having the status of an independent contractor .... " 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
45. See H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947), in 1 LwsisLATVE
HisTRo' OF THm LABOR MANAGEMENT RELA&TiONS Acr, 1947 309 (1948) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE HisTORY]; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33
(1947), in 1 LEGIsLATrvE HIsTORY at 536-37; 2 LESLATIVE HISToRY at 1537 (comments
of Senator Taft). See also Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 & n.10 (1964);
NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254,256 (1968).
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ing the scope of the term employee, common law agency principles
should be used to make the requisite determination. 6
In Brown v. NLRB,4 the Ninth Circuit cited with approval the
factors delineated in section 220(2) of the Restatement Second of
Agency as the elements which are to be applied when ascertaining, for
NLRA purposes, whether one performing work for another is a protect-
ed employee or an unprotected independent contractor. These factors
are: (1) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work; (2) whether the one employed is
engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (3) the kind of occupation
and whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction
of the employer; (4) the skill required in the particular operation; (5)
whether the employer supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place
of work; (6) the length of time for which the person is employed; (7)
whether payment is by the time or by the job; (8) whether the work is a
part of the regular business of the employer; (9) whether the parties
believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (10)
whether the principal is in business. 48 It appears that, at least in the
Ninth Circuit, these factors will ultimately have to be applied when a
group of physicians associated with a particular health care institution
requests NLRA protection. 49 Absent a finding that the physicians are
employees, they will receive none of the benefits of the NLRA.
46. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
47. 462 F.2d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 1972); see Carnation Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d
1130, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 1970); Associated Independent Owner-Operators, Inc. v. NLRB,
407 F.2d 1383, 1385 (9th Cir. 1969).
48. 462 F.2d at 705 n.10.
49. It should be noted that even a cursory examination of factors listed in the
Restatement Second of Agency should be sufficient to dispel any possible notion that an
employment relationship exists between a physician and a particular patient. That
attenuated relationship, which is fundamentally controlled almost completely by the
professional practitioner, has traditionally been considered to be one of independent
contractor, rather than one of employment. Absent some drastic change in the future,
this legal classification will continue to be recognized.
Although one could undoubtedly argue that the relationship which a modern
physician has with an insurance carrier, whether privately run or governmentally
operated (e.g., Medicare), should be considered to be one of employment, rather than
one of independent contractor, it is most unlikely that a labor relations agency or court
would accept this contention. While it is certainly true that such entities provide a
substantial portion of the average doctor's income (see note 7 & accompanying text
supra), they do not enter into direct relationships with the physicians: they merely
afford financial protection for their insured patients. In addition, the element of control
which an insurance carrier may exercise over a doctor's work is usually exercised
indirectly through a hospital utilization review committee (see note 10 & accompanying
text supra) or an independent PSRO (see notes 12-13 & accompanying text supra) and
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Staff Physician-Hospital Relationship
The medical staff of a hospital is generally divided into several
distinct categories. Resident and intern physicians are usually salaried
personnel subject to sufficient hospital control to render them employees
of the institution.50 At the opposite extreme are courtesy staff members,
who are in no way involved in the operation of the facility but who are
merely allowed occasionally to admit their patients to the hospital so that
they may treat them there.51 Courtesy staff members are classic inde-
pendent entrepreneurs who are excluded from NLRA coverage by the
independent contractor exemption contained in section 2(3).52 Situated
somewhere between the employee interns and residents and the nonem-
ployee courtesy staff doctors are the active staff members. This group
consists of the physicians who not only practice at the hospital on a
regular basis, but also participate actively in the organization and gov-
ernment of the institutional medical staff.53 It is this group which will in
the future present the most difficulty when the appropriate legal body54
endeavors to ascertain whether they are entitled to the benefits and
protections afforded by the NLRA.
Since the enactment of the 1974 amendment which extended
NLRA coverage to private, nonprofit hospitals,55 the labor board has
such review is generally of a post hoe nature. A carrier does not meaningfully regulate
the professional conduct of the physician during the actual performance of his work, as
an employer would usually do vis-h-vis one of his employees. On the contrary, the carrier
tends to evaluate only what the doctor has already done, and for the sole purpose of
determining what amount of reimbursement is appropriate under the health care policy
which it has with an insured patient. Thus, while an insurance carrer may certainly have
a direct impact upon the remuneration received by the physician, it has no real control
over his working conditions, nor generally does it control in advance the work under-
taken by the doctor. Any relationship which might exist between a carrier and a
practitioner is clearly one of independent contractor, not one of employment.
50. See Malpractice, supra note 26, at 954 n.3; 2A HosPrrAL LAw MANuAL,
Negligence § 1, 8-11 (1962). Although these sources pertain directly to the applicability
of the respondeat superior doctrine to hospital liability for the negligent acts of residents
and interns, their finding of a master-servant relationship is prumised upon regular
common law agency principles. A similar employment relationship would be present with
respect to other salaried physicians directly employed on a full or part-time basis by a
hospital.
51. See Note, Hospital Staff Privileges: The Need for Legislation, 17 STA. L
REv. 900, 904 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Staff Privileges]; Malpractice, supra note 26,
at 954 n.3.
52. See note 42 & accompanying text supra.
53. See Staff Privileges, supra note 51, at 904.
54. Although this determination will initially have to be made by the NLRB, the
decision will be of sufficient magnitude to warrant a prediction that appellate review will
be invoked before the question is finally resolved.
55. See notes 31-32 & accompanying text supra.
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not, unfortunately, been required to define the legal status of active
staff doctors. One reason for this situation is that NLRB General Coun-
sel Peter Nash recently decided unilaterally to preclude labor board
consideration of this vital question by refusing to issue an unfair labor
practice complaint 6 in a case in which it was alleged that a hospital
had refused to bargain in good faith57 concerning the duties of staff
physicians who served on the hospital's utilization review committee. 58
Although General Counsel Nash recognized that staff physicians were
required to serve on such hospital committees as a quid pro quo for
their right to practice at the facility, and that the functioning of such
committees was essential to the proper operation of the institution, he
decided that the hospital did not exercise sufficient control over the
committee work of the doctors to warrant the finding of an employment
relationship regarding such committee work.59 No findings were made
with respect to the overall physician-hospital relationship, as the issue
was not raised. It is this broader relationship which will be the focus
of future NLRB cases. When such questions arise the general counsel,
the labor board, and the courts will, hopefully, move "away from the
mechanical application of doctrinal rules toward a more realistic ap-
praisal of the relationship between legal theory and social reality."6
Application of the ten factors delineated in the Restatement Second
of Agency to the staff physican-hospital situation for the purpose of
distinguishing between employment and independent contractor rela-
tionships6' indicates that the ultimate determination will necessarily be
56. When the general counsel declines to issue an unfair labor practice complaint
after a charge has been filed, not only is the labor board denied the opportunity to
consider the matter (see NLRA § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970) ), but owing to
the unreviewable discretion of the general counsel in this area, courts are similarly pre-
cluded from resolving the issue. See, e.g., United Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Ordman,
366 F.2d 776 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967). See also Anthony v.
NLRB, 204 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1953); Manhattan Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 320
(10th Cir. 1952); Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306 (1st Cir. 1948). When such a funda-
mental statutory question is involved, the general counsel should resolve any possible
doubts in favor of a complaint, so that the labor board, and ultimately the appellate
courts, will be able finally to determine the matter. See Sections 10(e)-(f), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 160(e)-(f) (1970).
57. See note 38 & accompanying text supra.
58. See General Counsel Hospital Report, 88 LAE. REL. REP. 8, 12-13 (1975).
59. Id. The general counsel determined that the medical staff bylaws pertaining to
the functioning of the utilization review committee provided the physician-members with
complete autonomy concerning their review decisions. He therefore concluded that the
hospital not only exercised no control over the "means" used to operate the committee,
but actually had little influence upon the "ends" to be achieved. Id. at 13.
60. Malpractice, supra note 26, at 957.
61. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
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resolved by examining the control which the hospital exerts over the
professional work of the staff doctors. Examination of the relationship
in terms of the noncontrol elements is inconclusive, as four of the factors
support an independent contractor determination, while the other four
favor an employment conclusion.62
Staff physicians are undoubtedly engaged in a distinct occupation.
Furthermore, their profession entails an extremely high degree of skill.3
Such doctors are generally compensated for the job performed, rather
than by the hour or week.64 It is also clear that staff doctors and their
hospitals have traditionally believed that they were creating an inde-
pendent contractor relationship rather than an employment relation-
ship.65
On the other hand, it is the hospital which generally provides the
instrumentalities, tools, and major place of work for the staff doctors.
The relationship is of an indefinite, continuing nature. Moreover, the
modem hospital is not only engaged in a vast business enterprise, but
also commonly regarded as being a comprehensive health care center,66
which indicates that the staff physicians perform work which contributes
significantly to the regular business of the institution. Therefore, to re-
solve the inconclusive results of this evaluation, it is necessary to ex-
amine the degree of control and supervision actually exercised by the
hospital over its staff doctors.
Staff physicians were traditionally considered to be independent
contractors who merely used the facilities provided by hospitals; the
hospitals exercised little, if any, control over the professional services
62. The two "control" factors are number (1), which pertains to the control the
master may exercise over the details of the work, and number (3) which concerns the
amount of direction or supervision generally exercised by the master in the geographic
locality over the type of occupation involved.
63. It should be noted that merely because staff physicians practice a distinct
occupation involving a high degree of skill does not necessarily indicate the presence of
an independent contractor relationship. These characteristics are usually present with
respect to all professional workers, yet the NLRA expressly recognizes that such
professional personnel may well be employees since it establishes special unit determina-
tion rights for them. See NLRA § 9(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1970). See also
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). For the-statutory definition of "professional
employee" see NLRA section 2(12), 29 U.S.C. section 152 (12) (1970).
64. The fact that staff doctors are presently not paid by hospitals for their
professional work should not be controlling, since they provide an integral service
without which the health care institution could not function. Furthermore, should staff
physicians be provided with NLRA protection, it is likely they will demand compensa-
tion from their hospitals when their work inures to the benefit of the institutions.
65. See note 3 & accompanying text supra.
66. See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
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performed by these doctors." In recent years, however, health care
institutions have begun to exert much greater authority over their staff
physicians. The professional staff of a modem hopital is generally
organized into various committees. 68 These professional staff commit-
tees are usually composed primarily of practitioners, and the courts have
recognized that such committee members act as agents of the institution
during the performance of their adminstrative work. 9 This situation
creates the presence of "a vastly different relationship between the
corporate institution and the practicing physician than is suggested by
the historical distinction separating 'hospital' and 'medical' services." '7
Several relatively recent developments have provided hospitals with
significant impetus to increase substantially the degree of supervision
which they exercise over the professional work performed by their staff
physicians. Medicare and Medicaid regulations require hospitals to re-
view the medical services provided by their staff practitioners to eligible
beneficiaries.7 ' In addition, as the general public has increasingly come
to regard hospitals as comprehensive health care institutions which they
may visit whenever they require major medical treatment, they have
commensurately begun to expect institutionally-imposed quality control:
Public outrage, and possibly even an effect on admissions at a typi-
cal hospital, would surely follow a public announcement by the
hospital that it regards all staff doctors as completely independent
professionals, conducts no supervision of their performance and
takes no interest in their competence. The public assumes ...
that the hospital exerts some measure of control over the medical
activities taking place there.
72
Finally, recent judicial decisions concerning the legal responsiblity
of hospitals for the medical malpractice of their staff doctors almost
mandate considerable institutional control over the medical services
provided in such facilities. In the landmark case of Darling v. Charles-
67. See Southwick, supra note 4, at 434. See notes 2-3 & accompanying text supra.
68. See Staff Privileges, supra note 51, at 903.
69. Note, Hospital Liability for the Negligence of Physicians: Some Needed Legal
Sutures, 26 U. FLA. L. Rv. 844, 848 (1974); see cases cited id. n.39. Not only do the
hospital committees perform a necessary service for the institution (see note 10 &
accompanying text supra), but they also usurp an ever increasing amount of the staff
members' time. See 1 REPORT OF THE NATiONAL ADVISORY COMMSSION ON HEALTH
MAaowaa 14 (1967).
70. Southwick, supra note 4, at 435.
71. Hanson & Stromberg, supra note 27, at 27. See notes 8-13 & accompanying text
supra. To satisfy these requirements, most large hospitals have already established the
administrative apparatus needed to monitor effectively the staff members' medical
performance. Malpractice, supra note 5, at 965.
72. Malpractice, supra note 26, at 967.
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ton Community Memorial Hospital,73 the Illinois Supreme Court not
only upheld hospital liability for the injury suffered by Mr. Darling be-
cause of the inadequate care provided by the nurses, but also ruled that
the hospital had failed to review sufficiently the medical treatment ren-
dered to the patient by the attending staff physician. 4 The Darling
court thereby recognized the obligation of a modem hospital to super-
vise and control, at least minimally, the professional conduct of its staff
doctors. Since that decision, other courts have demonstrated an inclina-
tion to require similar supervision by hospitals of the medical perform-
ance of their staff practitioners.75
As the modem trend toward hospital tort liability continues, it
should become apparent "that the responsibility of lay hospital boards of
governors extends even to the quality of medical care in the hospital,
including the actions. . . even of the medical staff, not only in so-called
administrative actions, but in medical care of patients. 8 Under such
circumstances, the degree of control and supervision exercised by the
hospital over its staff physicians is more consistent with an employment
relationship than it is with a traditional independent contractor relation-
ship. The institution is not merely directing the staff practitioner to
complete an assigned task satisfactorily; rather, it is actually accepting
the responsibility for supervising and, where necessary to protect the
73. 33 11. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). Mr.
Darling went to the hospital emergency room for treatment of a broken leg. There he
was attended by the staff doctor on call. He was subsequently admitted to the hospital as
a patient of that staff physician. While he was in the hospital, a constricted cast caused
circulatory difficulties and substantial pain. The hospital nurses, who had failed to
monitor the patient's progress, did not inform the hospital administration of the patient's
suffering, nor did the attending staff practitioner take appropriate precautionary mea-
sures. As a result, the leg had to be amputated below the knee.
74. 33 Ill. 2d at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258.
75. See Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971); Purcell v.
Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972); Joiner v. Mitchell County Hospital
Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E-2d 307 (1971), aff'd, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412
(1972); Moore v. Board of Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 88 Nev. 207, 495 P.2d
605, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227
N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431
P.2d 973 (1967). See also Hanson & Stromberg, supra note 27, at 13; Note, Unnecessary
Surgery: Doctor and Hospital Liability, 61 GEo. LJ. 807, 814 (1973); Comment,
Hospital Liability-A New Duty of Care, 19 MAiNE L. Rlv. 102, 109-10 (1967). In
several states, hospital responsibility for reviewing the quality of medical care is
mandated by statute. See, e.g., ARm. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-445 (1971); IND. ANN.
STAT. CODE § 16-10-1-6.5 (Bums 1973); MxcH. Cowp. LAws ANN. § 331.422 (West
Supp. 1975).
76. Fabro, Legal Relationship of Physician to Hospital, 43 CONN. BJ. 418, 424
(1969). See generally Raymond, Regulation of Medical Care Rendered by Private
Physicians to Hospitalized Patients, 30 J. Mo. B. 93 (1974).
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rights of the patient, is even regulating the on-going professional per-
formance of the doctor.
In the future, the labor board should be exceedingly careful to
evaluate all the specific factors inherent in a particular staff physician-
hospital relationship before it accepts the traditional, yet possibly outdat-
ed, notion that only an independent contractor relationship is involved.
The NLRB should at least recognize the reasonable probability that an
employment relationship exists with respect to staff doctors who are
required to serve on hospital committees, since the performance of vital
committee work is often subject to the actual control of the hospital
administration.77 Furthermore, in those increasing instances in which
the institution meaningfully supervises and regulates the actual medical
services provided by staff physicians, the NLRB should be willing to
recognize the contemporary realities of the situation and accord such
hospital employees 78 the benefits and protections of the NLRA.
7
1
77. An employment finding with respect to committee work would afford the
physicians NLRA coverage for the performance of their committee assignments. The
hospital, as their committee employer, would be obligated to bargain with the appropri-
ately designated employee representative with respect to the wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of committee employment. See note 38 & accompanying text supra.
While the specter of such committee-oriented bargaining initially may seem strange to
some, it should be noted that there have already been several collective bargaining
agreements negotiated which cover only the hospital committee work of staff physicians.
See, e.g., Agreement Between Nevada Physicians Union, Local 676, SEIU, AFL-CIO,
and Valley Hospital, Ltd. (Sept. 1, 1972). (A copy of this agreement is in the author's
possession.) As expanding committee responsibilities detract from the medical practices
of the staff doctors involved, there will be increasing pressure upon hospitals to compen-
sate committee members for their services.
78. If courts are prepared to recognize the existence of employment relationships
in such situations for tort liability purposes, there is no rational basis for denying the
same employees NLRA coverage.
Since NLRA section 2(3), 29 U.S.C. section 152(3) (1970), expressly excludes
supervisors from the statutory definition of employee, it is quite possible that health care
institutions will assert that staff physicians who direct the work of hospital attendants
and nurses should be considered supervisory personnel who are not entitled to NLRA
coverage. Such an argument, however, should generally be rejected. Section 2(11) of the
labor act provides in relevant part: "The term 'supervisor' means any individual having
authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action .... "
NLRA § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970) (emphasis added). Although staff doctors
would usually not possess the authority to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, discipline, or adjust the grievances of other hospital personnel,
they would frequently have the right, particularly during surgical operations, to direct the
work of the ancillary employees. Nevertheless, this necessary function should not be
sufficient to deprive the physicians of employee status. The direction of such people
would be done on behalf of themselves and their patients only, rather than on behalf of
the medical facility, and it would merely involve that degree of control required for the
[Vol. 27
Physician-Employees of Private80
Employers Outside NLRB Jurisdiction
Under section 14(c)(2) of the NLRA,' states are permitted to
exercise labor jurisidction over private employers who are not subject to
the jurisdictional purview of the labor board. 2 This state jurisdiction
accomplishment of their professional obligation to their patients. The propriety of this
analysis has been recognized by the labor board which "has carefully avoided applying
the definition of 'supervisor' to a health care professional who gives direction to other
employees in the exercise of professional judgment, which direction is incidental to the
professional's treatment of patients, and thus is not the exercise of supervisory authority
in the interest of the employer." Wing Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 217 N.LR.B. No. 172,
89 L.R.R.M. 1183 (1975), slip op. at 4. See S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 6
(Apr. 2, 1974), in which Congress acknowledged the labor board's practice in this
regard. Therefore, in the absence of other indicia of "supervisory" authority, staff
physicians should not be considered to be supervisory personnel.
79. Staff physicians generally employed by a hospital would desire negotiations
concerning their working conditions at the hospital. They might also seek a grievance
procedure regarding actions taken by the institution's reviewing authority with respect
to their professional performance. Other relevant topics of mutual concern would con-
stitute additional appropriate subjects for bargaining.
80. It should be noted that salaried physicians employed by public entities are
entitled to certain labor relations benefits. All doctors who are nonsupervisory employees
of a department or agency of the federal government, such as a Veterans' Administration
hospital, are provided with substantial labor rights and protections under Exec. Order
No. 11491, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1971). Section 1 guarantees such employee-physicians
organizational rights similar to those delineated in section 7 of the NLRA (see note 33 &
accompanying text supra), while section 19(a) affords them protections analogous to
those described in sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA (see notes 34-
38 & accompanying text supra). See Fasser, The Right to Union Representation Under
Executive Order 11491, 25 LA. LJ. 531 (1974). See also Exec. Order No. 11838, 40
Fed. Reg. 5743 (Feb. 7, 1975) which amends Exec. Order No. 11491. See generally R.
SMmTH, H. EDWARDS & T. CLAnK, LAOR RELATIONS LAw IN =a PuBLIC SECrOR (1974).
Nevertheless, unlike their private sector counterparts, who are specifically guaranteed the
right to strike under section 13 of the NLRA, employees of the federal government are
expressly prohibited from engaging in any work stoppage. United Fed'n of Postal Clerks
v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C.), affd mem., 404 U.S. 802 (1971). Compare 29
U.S.C. § 163 (1970) with 5 U.S.C. 08 3333, 7311 (1970) and 18 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
Physicians employed by any local government, district, or department in California
are provided with similar rights and protections under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act.
CAL. GOV'T CODE H8 3501-10 (West 1966 & Supp. 1975), Instead of full collective bar-
gaining rights, however, they are permitted only "meet and confer" privileges. Id. § 3505
(West 1966 & Supp. 1975). Coverage analogous to that available under the Meyers-Mil-
ias-Brown Act is also accorded physicians employed by an agency, department, or com-
mission of the State of California. Id. §§ 3525-36 (West 1966). No public employees
in California may engage in any strike.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1970).
82. Prior to the enactment of section 14(c)(2) in 1959, states were preempted
from asserting jurisdiction over labor practices affecting interstate commerce but failing
to satisfy the NLRB's jurisdictional requirements. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd.,
353 U.S. 1 (1956).
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includes not only employers engaged in business usually subject to
labor board jurisdiction who are excluded from coverage owing to their
failure to satisfy the NLRB's monetary jurisdiction standards,83 but also
employers who perform functions considered by the board to be wholly
local in nature. For example, the NLRB recently indicated that it will
not assert jurisdiction over law firms, since it does not believe that they
have a sufficient impact upon interstate commerce to warrant NLRA
coverage.8 4 Similar reasoning may well induce the labor board to decline
jurisdiction over physicians engaged in group practices."5 In light of
contemporary developments indicating that there will soon be a substan-
tial proliferation of these medical practices in the form of health mainte-
nance organizations, 6 it becomes important to consider the labor pro-
tections afforded to employees of such private concerns under California
law.sT
Preferring to leave the resolution of labor disputes to the free
interaction of economic forces, California has generally adopted a lais-
sez-faire policy with respect to labor relations in the private sector."
This position generally permits a labor organization to engage in any
nonviolent activity which does not contravene a specific state policy.
Unfortunately, however, no procedures have been established by which
employees may peacefully require their employer to recognize and nego-
tiate with their duly designated bargaining representative.
Nevertheless, some minimal protection is afforded to employees.
The language of section 923 of the California Labor Code provides that
a worker
83. See note 32 supra.
84. Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, 206 N.L.R.B. 60 (1973); see
Note, NLRB Declines to Assert Jurisdiction Over Law Firms, 41 TENN. L. REv. 745
(1974); Note, Legal Services Have Insufficient Effect on Interstate Commerce to Justify
Exercise of NLRB Jurisdiction, 7 LOYOLA L. Rnv. (Los Angeles) 385 (1974).
85. Since medical practices are usually confined to relatively limited geographical
areas, while legal enterprises frequently involve matters which transcend local bounda-
ries, it appears that local group medical practices have a less significant impact than law
firms upon interstate commerce.
86. See notes 14-20 & accompanying text supra.
87. Although many of the physicians presently associated with such medical
groups enjoy nonemployee, partnership status, a few salaried doctors are already connect-
ed with such entities as employees. Prepaid Group Practice, supra note 14, at 904-05 &
n.9. As these programs expand, it is likely that more employment relationships involving
physicians will be created.
88. See Englund v. Chavez, 8 Cal. 3d 572, 584, 504 P.2d 457, 465, 105 Cal. Rptr.
521, 529 (1972); Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees Local 88, 53 Cal. 2d
455, 469, 349 P.2d 76, 85, 2 Cal. Rptr. 470, 479 (1960).
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shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of
employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such rep-
resentatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection.89
This provision has been interpreted to mean that an employer may not
discharge or otherwise interfere with an employee solely because of his
membership in, or activity on behalf of, a labor organization, or in
response to his selection of a bargaining representative. 90 Nonetheless,
section 923 does not specifically impose any further restrictions upon
employer conduct. For example, since section 923 specifices only that
"negotiation of terms and conditions of labor should result from volun-
tary agreement between employer and employees,"9 1 it is recognized
that an employer is not required by law to engage in collective bargain-
ing with a union, even if it actually represents a majority of the employ-
ees involved.92 Therefore, so long as an employer of physicians does
not interfere with their exercise of the rights specified in section 923,
that employer is legally permitted to ignore the efforts of such employ-
ees to establish a collective bargaining relationship with him. Should
the employed doctors be in a position to exert significant economic
pressure on their employer, however, they may still be able to achieve
the desired negotiating objectives, provided they do not engage in con-
duct proscribed by other federal or state provisions.
Since physicians who are desirous of exerting united economic
pressure against those entities which substantially control their economic
destinies will necessarily have to engage in concerted activity, they may
very possibly encounter antitrust difficulties, unless they can demon-
strate the inapplicability of such laws to their conduct. It therefore
becomes imperative to consider the impact of the federal and state
antitrust provisions upon physician organizing efforts.
Antitrust Considerations
A bifurcated analysis is necessary to a discussion of potential,
antitrust liability. The first inquiry concerns whether certain contemplat-
ed activities would constitute substantive violations of federal or Califor-
nia antitrust provisions. Then, if a specific substantive violation is
89. CAL. LABOR CODE § 923 (West 1971).
90. See Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1970); Glenn
v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961).
91. CAL. LABOR CODE § 923 (West 1971).
92. See Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees Local 88, 53 Cal. 2d 455,
469-74, 349 P.2d 76, 85-88, 2 Cal. Rptr. 470, 479-82 (1960).
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established, it becomes necessary to evaluate the possible applicability of
one or more of the recognized exemptions from the antitrust laws.
Substantive Antitrust Ramifications
Although the California Cartwright Antitrust Act9 3 applies to all
restraints of trade involving California business, while the federal Sher-
man Antitrust Act94 covers only those restraints which meaningfully
affect interstate or foreign commerce,9 5 it is generally recognized that
the two statutes proscribe the same basic forms of activity. Therefore,
the areas of common substantive coverage will be discussed first; an
analysis of the Sherman Act's interstate commerce requirement will
follow.
Activities Permitted and Prohibited
Under the Sherman and Cartwright Acts
The relevant portion of the federal Sherman Act proscribes
"[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations."96
Although the pertinent language of the California Cartwright Act"7 is
quite different from that contained in section 1 of the Sherman Act, it
has generally been interpreted as prohibiting the same types of restraints
upon trade. The Cartwright Act was patterned after the Sherman Act;
both have their roots in the common law. Thus it is recognized that
federal court decisions interpreting the substantive portions of the Sher-
man Act are persuasive authority with respect to Cartwright Act cases.9"
At the outset, it is important to emphasize the fact that both
antitrust statutes proscribe only combinations and conspiracies. Wholly
individual conduct is not restricted.99 Therefore, so long as an individual
93. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-16758 (West 1964 & Supp. 1975).
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970). See also Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 14-31
(1970); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-43, 45-48 (1973 & Pamphlet
No. 1, 1975).
95. See text accompanying notes 119-38 infra.
96. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1973) as amended (Pamphlet No. 1, 1975).
97. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (West 1964).
98. See Corwin v. City of Los Angeles Newspaper Service Bureau, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d
842, 484 P.2d 953, 94 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1971); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great W. Fin.
Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 305, 444 P.2d 481, 70 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1968). See generally Von
Kalinowski & Hanson, California Antitrust Laws: A Comparison with the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 6 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 533 (1959).
99. This conclusion, of course, assumes that the individual in question does not
possess monopoly power. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1973) as amended (Pamphlet No. 1,
(1975)). Single physicians could seldom (and then only in the case of a unique and
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practitioner acts alone, and not in concert or combination with other
physicians or groups, his actions would not fall within the coverage of
either the Sherman Act or the Cartwright Act. This right provides an
individual doctor with the opportunity legally to refuse to deal with any
party with whom he does not wish to have professional contact.100 For
example, if an individual physician is not satisfied with the conditions an
insurance carrier intends to impose upon his handling of a particular
case, he may simply refuse to provide his professional services to the
patient in question, leaving the insurance carrier to locate a different
doctor.10' Similarly, if a single practitioner is unhappy in his relationship
with a certain hospital, he may legitimately decide to terminate his
relations with that institution.'
0 2
Although an individual doctor may not, acting alone, possess
sufficient power to affect meaningfully the policies of large organiza-
tions such as hospitals and insurance carriers, he may not be the only
party who is actively demonstrating his dissatisfaction. If one physician
is sufficiently incensed to refuse to begin or continue a disadvantageous
relationship, there is substantial likelihood that other individual doctors
will resort to similar action. Whenever hospitals or insurance carders are
imposing truly unreasonable conditions, there is a significant possibility
that individual action by many independent doctors will encourage those
organizations to reconsider seriously their opprobrious policies.
An important caveat must always be considered, however, with
respect to "individualistic" conduct. So long as a physician acts com-
pletely alone, he is protected from antitrust liability. Nevertheless, if
revolutionary method) possess sufficient market power to precipitate monopolization
considerations. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); Interna-
tional Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959); United States v. E.I. duPont
de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 n.23 (1956).
100. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); cf. United States v.
Park Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). See also 1 HANDLm, TwErNr-FrvE YEARS op
ANTrrRusT 444-48 (1973); Dam & Pitofsky, Debate: Is the Colgate Doctrine Dead?, 37
ANT'TRusT L.L 772 (1968); Halper, Individual Refusals to Deal: Customer Selection or
Dealer Protection?, 22 A.B.A. Swr. Amrmusr L. 49'(1963); Turner, The Definition of
Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75
HARv. L. Rnv. 655 (1962).
101. Insurance carriers currently pay for over two-thirds of the nation's medical
expenses (see note 5 supra). Therefore, if the conditions causing the doctor's consterna-
tion are typical of those generally imposed by all such carriers, a physician's decision not
to perform services for patients insured by these carriers could easily have a substantial
adverse impact on the overall earnings of that doctor.
102. Of course, when there is only one major medical facility in the geographical
area in which the physician practices, this alternative may not be practically available to
him.
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there is meaningful evidence that he is in fact acting pursuant to some
concerted plan or scheme, his protection will be forfeited.' A physician
must therefore be extremely careful not to encourage other practitioners
to engage in similar "individual" behavior, since such encouragement
might possibly be sufficient to establish the existence of the proscribed
combination or conspiracy. As a consequence, physician unions and
associations would be precluded from expressly or impliedly inducing or
encouraging action by their members, unless they could otherwise dem-
onstrate the inapplicability of the antitrust laws to their concerted en-
deavors.
Not all combinations or conspiracies which impose restrictions
upon trade or commerce are illegal. The United States Supreme Court
has recognized that only "unreasonable" restraints are proscribed by the
Sherman Act.104 The California courts have similarly interpreted the
Cartwright Act as prohibiting only unreasonable restrictions. 10 5 There-
fore, concerted activity which has a legitimate objective, unrelated to any
intention to restrain trade, and which only incidentally inhibits business,
will usually not be found violative of the Sherman and Cartwright acts.
For example, it would probably be permissible for a physician organiza-
tion to induce California industrial accident insurance carriers to agree
to resolve all questions concerning the fees they will pay physicians in
particular workers' compensation cases through direct negotiation with
the individual practitioner involved, rather than by having such carriers
unilaterally impose their own fee schedules upon the doctors. This
arrangement would encourage free and open business dealings between
the participating insurance carriers and individual physicians, and would
effect, at most, a de minimis restraint on trade. Furthermore, such
individually negotiated fee schedules are specifically contemplated by
section 5304 of the California Labor Code, which provides that the
103. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966);
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord,
246 F.2d 368, 374 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957). But see Theatre
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); Kline v.
Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 232-33 (9th Cir. 1974); Independent Iron Works,
Inc. v. United States Stee' Corp., 322 F.2d 656 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922
(1963); Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199
(3rd Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962). See generally Turner, The Definition
of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75
HAnv. L. R.nv. 655 (1962).
104. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
105. See People v. Building Maintenance Contractors' Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 719, 727,
264 P.2d 31, 36-37 (1953); Milton v. Hudson Sales Corp., 152 Cal. App. 2d 418, 313
P.2d 936 (1957).
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Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) has jurisdiction over
any controversy concerning the fees to be paid to physicians who
perform services in industrial accident cases, "unless an express agree-
ment fixing the amounts to be paid for medical, surgical or hospital
treatment . . . has been made between the persons or institutions
rendering such treatment and the employer or insurer."'' 8 It is impor-
tant to recognize, however, that a physician organization and insurance
carriers could not agree upon the actual fees which are to be paid to
individual physicians, for this type of concerted arrangement would
constitute a clear antitrust violation.
Certain concerted activities are considered to have so pernicious an
effect upon trade that they constitute per se violations of the Sherman
Act, regardless of any protestations of reasonableness. For example,
price-fixing agreements involving competitors have traditionally been
considered illegal per se; the arguably reasonable nature of these ar-
rangements is viewed as irrelevant.'0 7  Similarly, concerted refusals to
deal and group boycotts have historically been condemned as per se
violations of the Sherman Act. 08 It is interesting to note, however, that
while group boycotts and concerted refusals to deal have also been
considered to be per se violations of the Cartwright Act, 09 the current
status of price-fixing arrangements under the California antitrust statute
is not wholly clear.
In Herriman v. Menzies,'" a pre-Cartwright Act case which was
decided under the common law, the California Supreme Court held that
a price-fixing agreement which had been entered into by only a few
members of a particular industry was legal, since there was no demon-
stration that the prices agreed upon were unreasonable or that there was
106. CAL. LABOR CODE § 5304 (West 1971). It is established that when such an
express agreement has been entered into between an individual physician and the injured
worker's employer or the employer's insurance carrier, that contractual obligation may be
enforced in an action at law. See, e.g., Independence Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 2 Cal. 2d 397,41 P.2d 320 (1935); Tomlinson v. Superior Ct., 66 Cal. App. 2d
640, 152 P.2d 517 (1944).
107. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 43 U.S.L.W. 4723, 4726 (June 16,
1975); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 135 (1969); United States
v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1942); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
108. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959); Fashion Originators'
Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941). See generally Barber, Refusals to
Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847 (1955).
109. See People v. Inland Bid Depository, 233 Cal. App. 2d 851, 860, 44 Cal. Rptr.
206, 212 (1965).
110. 115 Cal. 16, 46 P.730 (1896).
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any interference with the freedom of others to engage in that trade.
Nevertheless, subsequent cases, decided under the Cartwright Act, have
specifically questioned the continuing validity of the rationale applied in
Menzies."' Although these Cartwright Act cases have expressly indicat-
ed that price-fixing by competitors who dominate an industry constitutes
an unlawful restraint of trade, it is unclear whether a price-fixing
arrangement is presently illegal under that act regardless of the amount
of market control exercised by the involved competitors.' 12 It appears
that the membership of any physician organization which could repre-
sent its members effectively in their dealings with insurance carriers,
governmental agencies, or health care institutions would necessarily
constitute a significant portion of the relevant medical practitioner mar-
ket in California; consequently, any price-fixing activity involving that
group would be illegal under the Cartwright Act."'
Although a labor organization composed of medical practitioners
might reasonably be expected to concern itself with many social and
professional issues which transcend the typical worker-employer rela-
tionship, it is still obvious that many physicians are likely to form and
participate in doctor unions for the purpose of enhancing their economic
position vis-a-vis the well organized health care industry, which includes
hospitals, insurance carriers, and Medicare and MediCal agencies."' A
physician organization which is unable to immunize its conduct under
one of the recognized exemptions to the antitrust laws" 5 would have to
refrain from any activity aimed at achieving a price-fixing arrangement
among its members alone or involving other entities, as well. A price-
establishing agreement negotiated between a physician union and an
institution which remunerates doctors for their professional services
would violate the Sherman and Cartwright acts, 1 6 in the absence of an
applicable exemption. Furthermore, should a physician organization, in
an effort to enhance its negotiating position, resort to labor's traditional
bargaining weapon, the work stoppage, this conduct would most likely
11. See, e.g., People v. Building Maintenance Contractors' Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 719,
264 P.2d 31 (1953).
112. See 33 CAL. JUR. 2d Monopolies § 11 (1957).
113. Support for this conclusion may also be derived from the fact that physicians
may reasonably be considered to perform a vital public service. See, e.g., Coombs v.
Burke, 40 Cal. App. 8, 180 P.59 (1919).
114. See notes 5-13 & accompanying text supra.
115. See text accompanying notes 139-94 infra. See also text accompanying notes
119-38 infra, regarding the commerce requirement of the Sherman Act.
116. Collective bargaining contracts can clearly constitute antitrust violations under
appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Local 3, 325 U.S. 797
(1945). See notes 107, 110-13 & accompanying text supra.
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be considered a boycott or concerted refusal to deal, which would
automatically be proscribed by the antitrust laws, 117 unless the organiza-
tion were able to avail itself of the protection of one of the established
exemptions. 118 For this reason, it is necessary to examine not only the
historically developed antitrust exemption doctrines, but also the inter-
state commerce requirement of the Sherman Act.
Interstate Commerce Requirement For
Shertman Act Applicability
Although the Cartwright Act applies to all unreasonable restraints
of trade imposed upon California business, it is clear that section 1 of
the Sherman Act"9 merely pertains to those business restraints which
meaningfully affect interstate or foreign commerce. In an antitrust
action brought under the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must affirmatively
demonstrate the requisite effect upon interstate commerce as a condition
to recovery.
The interstate commerce requirement of the Sherman Act may be
satisfied in either of two ways. It may be established that the activity
complained of occurred within interstate commerce. 20 Alternatively, the
plaintiff may show that while the acts in question were themselves local
or intrastate in nature, they directly and substantially affected interstate
117. See notes 108-09 & accompanying text supra. Even though the insurance carrier
or health care institution affected may not be in competition with the practitioner-
members of the physician organization, concerted boycott activities would still be
violations of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207 (1959); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211
(1951). See also Note, Antitrust Law-Group Boycotts-Private Associations, 21 CAsE
W. REs. L. Rnv. 314 (1970).
118. Antitrust laws would not prevent organized physicians from approaching
governmental officials in an effort to induce them to take action which would be
beneficial to medical practitioners, even though such action might have an adverse
impact upon parties engaged in trade or commerce. See United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-71 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight Co., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); cf. California Motor Tramp. Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). See also Note, Application of the Sherman Act to
Attempts to Influence Government Action, 81 HARP. L. REv. 847 (1968); Note,
Solicitation of Governmental Action in Restraint of Trade-Noerr Revisited, 8 HousT.
L. REv. 952 (1971). It would thus be permissible for a physician organization to use
legal means to convince the Administrative Director who establishes the minimum fee
schedule for industrial accident cases in California to promulgate a minimum compensa-
tion schedule which is acceptable to medical practitioners. Other such lobbying efforts
directed toward favorable action by public officials would similarly be protected.
119. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955); Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
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commerce. 121 Therefore, were a "national" or "international" physician
organization, such as the American Federation of Physicians and Den-
tists, to negotiate a price-fixing agreement having multistate applicabili-
ty, the "in commerce" requirement of the Sherman Act would ipso facto
be satisfied.'22 In the more likely event, however, that a wholly intrastate
fee arrangement were collectively bargained by a physician union, the
requisite jurisdictional standard would have to be established by demon-
strating that the agreement directly and substantially affected interstate
commerce. 
123
It is well recognized that some entirely local activities, in which
none of the participants is involved directly in interstate business, may
nevertheless have the requisite effect upon commerce, for "[i]f it is
interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the
operation which applies the squeeze."' 24 The quality of the effect,
however, must always be evaluated:
[D]espite the increased thrust of federal commerce power as busi-
ness operations become more interrelated and complex, the
courts have consistently required that in order for federal antitrust
jurisdiction to be sustained the effect on interstate commerce of an
alleged antitrust violation in a local area must be direct and
substantial, and not merely inconsequential, remote or fortuitous.1 25
The mere fact that an intrastate fee arrangement involves insurance
carriers or hospitals engaged in interstate commerce does not automati-
cally demonstrate the required effect upon interstate commerce: "The
test of jurisdiction is not that the acts complained of affect a business
engaged in interstate commerce, but that the conduct complained of
affects the interstate commerce of such business."'
26
121. See, e.g., Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967); United States v. Employing
Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954); United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs.
Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949). See generally Eiger, The Commerce Element in Federal
Antitrust Litigation, 25 FED. B.J. 282 (1965); Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman
Act, 1959 DuKE L.J. 236.
122. See note 120 supra.
123. See cases cited at note 121 supra.
124. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
See Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323, 332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961). See
also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 43 U.S.L.W. 4723, 4726-27 (June 16, 1975).
125. Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323, 332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961)
(emphasis added); see Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,
334 U.S. 219, 234 (1948).
126. Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323, 330 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875




In John Kalin Funeral Home, Inc. v. Fultz,"21 the court held that a
group of morticians who conspired to monoplize the mortuary business
within a particular county did not sufficiently affect interstate commerce
to bring their otherwise proscribed activity within the jurisidictional
purview of the Sherman Act. The shipment of some bodies to and from
the state of Washington failed to provide the requisite effect, since such
activity was-only incidental to the morticians' general business. A similar
conclusion was reached in Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State
Disposal Co.,x1s in which the court refused to find Sherman Act juris-
diction with respect to a conspiracy among local refuse dealers which
detrimentally affected the plaintiff, despite the fact that the plaintiff had
been engaged in the business of leasing containers which it obtained
from out of state. Furthermore, the court in Sun Valley Disposal deemed
not controlling the fact that the plaintiff also engaged in business in a
different state, since it did not appear that such out-of-state commerical
activities were connected with the intrastate operations affected by the
challenged conduct.
Similar reasoning has been used to exempt the concerted activities
of intrastate medical groups from the application of the Sherman Act. In
Spears Free Clinic and Hospital for Poor Children v. Cleere,129 the
plaintiff contended that the defendant medical doctors had conspired to
restrain the practice of chiropractic treatment within the state of Colo-
rado. Despite the allegation that persons from other states and nations
regularly visited Colorado to obtain such treatment, the court refused to
find the necessary impact upon interstate commerce:
Here, the purpose and object of the conspiracy and of the means
adopted to effectuate it, were to restrain the practice of chiropractic
and to allocate to the medical profession the practice of the healing
arts in Colorado. It is this exclusively local aim and not the for-
tuitous and incidental effect upon interstate and foreign commerce
which gives character to the conspiracy. The effect upon interstate
and foreign commerce was fortuitous and remote and not direct and
substantial. 30
The Supreme Court used almost identical reasoning in United States v.
Oregon State Medical Society, 3' the only case in which it has actually
considered the interstate nature of medical practitioner combinations. 32
127. 313 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wash. 1970), afrd, 442 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 881 (1971).
128. 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969).
129. 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952).
130. Id. at 128.
131. 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
132. Although a Sherman Act violation was found in American Medical Ass'n v.
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The Court indicated that a medical association conspiracy aimed at
restraining the prepaid group medical business in a particular state was
not within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act, since the effect of such
an intrastate combination upon interstate commerce was only "sporadic
and incidental."'l 3 Lower federal courts have reached analogous results
in Sherman Act cases pertaining to concerted activity undertaken by
intrastate medical groups. 34
The reasoning of the above cases indicates that physician organiza-
tions are generally immune from Sherman Act liability if their concerted
endeavors are conducted on a relatively localized basis within a single
state. An agreement negotiated with an individual hospital, or even with
several health care facilities located in a particular county to establish a
compensation scale for institutional services such as committee work
performed by staff doctors, should be exempt from Sherman Act cover-
age. A multi-hospital agreement of this type concerning health care
facilities in several counties within one state should likewise be outside
the jurisdictional purview of the Sherman Act, because the scheme
would be fundamentally local in nature, and any impact upon interstate
commerce would be remote and incidental.
A more difficult problem concerns the status of a fee-fixing ar-
rangement pertaining to the professional medical services performed by
organized physicians within a particular state. While the impact upon
individual patients would certainly be confined to the specific state
involved, the effect upon insurance carriers might raise complex consid-
erations. Higher medical costs in one state could precipitate increased
premium rates in other states if an interstate insurance carrier endeav-
ored to diffuse the extra cost among all of its policy holders. Because
such an argument for Sherman Act coverage would, if accepted, effec-
tively obliterate the distinction between interstate and intrastate com-
merce whenever any interstate enterprise is affected, courts should pro-
ceed cautiously. 3 ' Collectively bargained fee schedules which are
United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), this decision did not involve any interstate
commerce issue. Since the case arose within the District of Columbia, the federal courts
were able to exercise the plenary jurisdiction which section 3 of the Sherman Act
provides with respect to restraints of trade occurring within the nation's capital. 15
U.S.C.A. § 3 (1973), as amended (Pamphlet No. 1, 1975). See also United States v.
American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 644 (1940).
133. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 339 (1952).
134. See Elizabeth Hospital, Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1959);
Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957); Polhemus v.
American Medical Ass'n, 145 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1944). See also Wolf v. Jane Phillips
Episcopal Memorial Medical Center, 513 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1975).
135. Although initially one might argue for Sherman Act coverage with respect to
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applicable only on an intrastate basis, and other concerted activities
intended merely to enhance the economic strength of organized physi-
cians within a particular state, might reasonably be found to be immune
from Sherman Act coverage on the basis of the peculiarly local nature of
medical practice.1 86
Because of the possibility that a pervasive intrastate medical practi-
tiondr combination might be found to have the requisite impact upon
interstate commerce, 1' 7 and because all multistate group arrangements
would automatically affect interstate commerce,13 8 it appears that physi-
cian organizations might not always be able to avoid Sherman Act
liability by relying upon the interstate commerce requirement. In addi-
tion, since the Cartwright Act regulates even wholly intrastate restraints
upon trade, it becomes imperative to consider recognized antitrust ex-
emptions which might insulate the concerted efforts of doctors from
liability under those acts.
Possible Protections Under Recognized Antitrust Exemptions
The 'Learned Profession" Exemption
Even if parties have engaged in concerted activity which is other-
concerted activity aimed at affecting the federal Medicare System, it must be remem-
bered that "[t]he test of jurisdiction is not that the acts complained of affect a business
engaged in interstate commerce, but that the conduct complained of affects the interstate
commerce of such business." Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323, 330 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 875 (1961). Despite the fact that Medicare is an interstate program, so long as
an intrastate medical group merely affects the operation of that program within a single
state, Sherman Act coverage should not be imposed. But cf. Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 43 U.S.L.W. 4723, 4727 (June 16, 1975). Goldfarb may indicate an opposite result
if Medicare and interstate insurance carriers were significantly affected by a wholly
intrastate medical price-fixing arrangement.
136. A plaintiff might argue that when concerted conduct substantively constitutes a
per se violation of the Sherman Act the requisite jurisdictional standard should be
satisfied even if only a de minimis effect upon interstate commerce can be established.
Such a contention, however, should not be too readily accepted. While it is recognized
that a price-fixing conspiracy which operates on or within the flow of interstate
commerce affects such commerce as a matter of law, it is equally established that a
similar combination engaged in at an entirely intrastate level does not, as a matter of
law, have the required impact upon interstate commerce. Therefore, unless it is demon-
strated that the intrastate activities complained of substantially and directly affect
interstate commerce, there is no jurisdiction under the Sherman Act despite the otherwise
per se nature of the alleged violation. See Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323, 331-32 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961); Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United
States, 210 F.2d 732, 747 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
It should be emphasized that unlike attorneys who frequently have an integral
impact upon interstate business despite the seemingly localized nature of a particular
transaction being examined, medical practitioners very rarely engage in professional
endeavors which are so inextricably intertwined with interstate commerce.
137. See Physician Unions, supra note 25, at 997-99.
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wise violative of the substantive proscriptions of the Sherman Act and
the Cartwright Act, they may nevertheless escape liability under recog-
nized exemptions to the federal and California antitrust laws. These
exemptions have been developed to immunize the conduct of certain
groups from the coverage of those enactments. The pertinent Sherman
Act exemptions will be discussed first; an examination of the Cart-
wright Act exemptions will follow.
Relevant Sherman Act Exemptions
Two of the traditionally recognized Sherman Act exemptions might
be applicable to concerted activities undertaken by a labor-oriented
physcian organization. Once concerns the so-called "learned profes-
siones," while the other deals with bona fide labor activities.
The "Learned Profession" Exemption
Although section 1 of the Sherman Act specifically prohibits only
restraints upon "trade or commerce,"'839 it has long been recognized that
the scope of that provision includes service organizations and their
members, even though they deal in services rather than commodities.'
40
When the service involved concerned a "learned profession," such as
law, medicine, or dentistry, however, it was not wholly clear whether
such an activity should be considered to constitute trade within the
meaning of the Sherman Act.'
4'
In 1931, the Supreme Court specifically recognized that medical
practitioners "follow a profession and not a trade"'42 and this concept
was confirmed by the Court in 1932 in Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc.
v. United States.14  Although the Court recognized the fact that a
139. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
140. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485,
490 (1950); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940); Atlantic Cleaners
& Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 434-37 (1932). See generally Note, The
Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other "Non-Commercial"
Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313 (1972).
141. The ambiguous status of the "learned professions" apparently evolved from
some wholly gratuitous language contained in an opinion which was construing the term
"trade" as utilized in the Coasting and Fishery Act of 1793. "Mhe word 'trade' is often,
and indeed generally, used . . . as equivalent to occupation, employment, or business,
whether manual or mercantile. Wherever any occupation, employment, or business is
carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in
the learned professions, it is constantly called a trade." The Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506, 507
(No. 10, 388) (C.C. Me. 1834) (emphasis added).
142. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931).
143. 286 U.S. 427 (1932).
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business consisting primarily of personal services should be considered a
trade within the meaning of the federal antitrust laws, it specifically
indicated that services involving one of the "learned professions" might
not be so regarded. 144 Some lower courts thus continued to hold that
the "learned professions" were not trades within the meaning of the
Sherman Act.
1 45
In its recent decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the Su-
preme Court held that the "learned professions" are not ipso facto
exempt from Sherman Act coverage merely because of the professional
nature of the services provided. 146 The Court rejected the effort of a state
bar association to achieve complete antitrust immunity through the
"learned profession" exemption, since it could not "find support for the
proposition that Congress intended any such sweeping exclusion!' from
the pervasive jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act.147 It thus con-
cluded that "[ihe nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not
provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act, nor is the public service aspect
of professional practice controlling in determing whether § 1 includes
professions."M'4 The Court in Goldfarb indicated, however, that some
144. Id. at 436; see United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S.
485 (1950).
145. See, e.g., Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266, 268 (8th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1958); United States v. Oregon State Medidal
Soc'y, 95 F. Supp. 103 (D. Ore. 1950), aft'd on other grounds, 343 U.S. 326 (1952). But
see United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 710 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 644 (1940).
146. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 43 U.S.L.W. 4723 (U.S. June 16, 1975).
147. Id. at 4728.
148. Id. (citations omitted). The Court further indicated that it was no disparage-
ment of a profession to acknowledge that its involvement with "the exchange of [a
professional] service for money is 'commerce' in the most common usage of that word,"
thus subjecting the business aspects of the profession to Sherman Act regulations. Id.
It is interesting to note that even in the absence of the Goldfarb decision, there
would have been a substantial likelihood that pernicious activities undertaken by a
physician-union would nonetheless have been subject to Sherman Act coverage. In
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), the Supreme Court was
able to apply the federal antitrust laws to the activities of a medical association by using
an innovative analysis which obviated the necessity of deciding whether any "learned
profession" immunity should be officially recognized. In that case, the medical associa-
tion and its physician-members were charged with conspiring to restrain and obstruct the
prepaid medical program of Group Health. The Court first determined that the Group
Health enterprise was engaged in a business or trade within the meaning of the Sherman
Act. It then noted that the Sherman Act prohibits "every person" from combining to
impose a proscribed restraint upon "trade or commerce," and concluded that the legal
status of the occupation practiced by the defendant physicians was immaterial, since the
purpose and effect of their conspiracy was the restraint of the Group Health business. Id.
at 528. (Although the case arose under section 3 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. section
3, since it pertained to a combination within the District of Columbia, it is important to
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limited antitrust immunity not provided for ordinary commercial activi-
ties might still be available to the organized endeavors of lawyers and
medical practitioners because of their professional status:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distin-
guished from a business is, of course, relevant in determining
whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It
would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as inter-
changeable with other business activities, and automatically to
apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other
areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the profes-
sions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly
be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context,
be treated differently.
149
Therefore, if a physician organization engaged in conduct clearly in-
tended to enhance the ethical or professional standards of the medical
profession, its endeavors would quite possibly be immune from Sherman
Act coverage. If a physician union undertook concerted activities for the
primary purpose of benefiting the personal economic interests of its
practitioner-members, 150 however, any protection which might otherwise
note that the operative language of that section is identical to the relevant portion of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Therefore, under the rationale of the American Medical
Association holding, any anticompetitive concerted activity taken against a health care
institution or an insurance carrier, both of which clearly constitute "trade" within the
meaning of the Sherman Act (see, e.g., United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
(1943) ), for the purpose of enhancing the commercial interest of medical practitioners,
would have transcended the scope of any blanket protection which might otherwise have
been provided by a "learned profession" exemption which existed prior to the Goldfarb
decision).
149. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4728 n.17. This statement was basically a reiteration of the
position which the Supreme Court had previously enunciated in United States v. Oregon
State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952), in which it had observed: "[There are
ethical considerations where the historic direct relationship between patient and physi-
cian is involved which are quite different than the usual considerations prevailing in
ordinary commercial matters. This Court has recognized that forms of competition usual
in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession." See
also Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
150. Because of the business-oriented nature of labor organizations, no bona fide
physicians' union would be able to rely upon the "traditionally non-commercial" excep-
tion to Sherman Act coverage recognized in Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle
States Ass'n of College & Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 965 (1970): "MIhe proscriptions of the Sherman Act were 'tailored . . . for the
business world,' not for the non-commercial aspects of the liberal arts and the learned
professions. In these contexts, an incidental restraint of trade, absent an intent or
purpose to affect the commercial aspects of the profession, is not sufficient to warrant
application of the antitrust laws." Id. at 654 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Any
concerted effort by a physician organization designed to enhance the doctors' economic
position would directly pertain to the "commercial" aspects of the medical profession and
it would ipso facto exceed the scope of protection afforded by the rationale enunciated in
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be available to professionals under the. rationale enunciated in the
Goldfarb and Oregon State Medical Society decisions would most likely
be forfeited.""' The organization would thus have to rely upon some
other antitrust exemption.
The Labor Exemption
Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act 52 have been interpreted in
concert with sections 4 and 13 of the Norris-La Guardia Act 5 s to
provide labor organizations with a partial exemption from the federal
antitrust laws. The statutorily created labor exemption immunizes union
activities from Sherman Act liability to the extent they are conducted in
furtherance of union objectives and occur within the perimeters of a
"labor dispute," as that term is defined in section 20 of the Clayton Act
as read in conjunction with section 13 of the Norris-La Guardia Act: 5 '
Marjorie Webster. See generally Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act
Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 705 (1962).
151. Although a physicians' union might argue that the establishment of minimum
fee schedules would effectively guarantee competent and conscientious medical care, it is
doubtful that a court would allow such reasoning to immunize the otherwise per se
violation of the Sherman Act which would be involved. See Physician Union, supra note
26, at 994-95; Note, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other
"Non-Commercial Activities, 82 YALE LJ. 313, 333-34 (1972).
152. Section 6, 15 U.S.C. section 17 (1970), provides in relevant part: 'The labor
of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the
antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor ...
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help.. . or to forbid or restrain any
individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out .the legitimate
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
antitrust laws."
Section 20, 29 U.S.C. section 52 (1970), provides in relevant part: "No restraining
order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States ... in any case
between an employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between
employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or
growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment. .. ."
153. 29 U.S.C. § 104, 113 (1970). Section 113 provides in relevant part: "(b) A
person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor
dispute... if he or it is engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in
which the dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein, or is a member...
of any association composed in whole or in part of employers or employees engaged in
such industry, trade, craft, or occupation. (c) The term 'labor dispute' includes any
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee:'
154. See, e.g., Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S.
821 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). See generally Cox,
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So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups, the licit and illicit under section 20 [of the
Clayton Act] are not to be distinguished by any judgment regard-
ing the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the sel-
fishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union
activities are the means. 155
As the italicized language indicates, however, the scope of the labor
exemption is not limitless.
When a labor organization combines with non-labor groups to
effectuate an inappropriate restraint upon interstate commerce, the un-
ion is unable to rely upon the protection provided by the labor exemp-
tion: "Congress never intended that unions could, consistently with the
Sherman Act, aid non-labor groups to create business monopolies and to
control the marketing of goods and services."'15
To be able effectively to invoke the labor exemption from the
federal antitrust laws, a labor organization and its members must initial-
ly be able to demonstrate that one of two situations is present: (1) the
disputing parties stand in the relationship of employer and employee
and the dispute affects some aspect of that relationship; or (2) the
employer-employee relationship of other parties constitutes the crux of
the dispute precipitating the antitrust case. 157 Therefore, when truly
independent businessmen combine, even in the guise of a labor organi-
zation, they cannot resort to the labor exemption to immunize conduct
which restrains trade, since their conduct is realistically intended to
enhance their own entrepreneurial interests, rather than meaningfully to
affect some employer-employee relationship. 5 8 The exemption is un-
available even if such independent businessmen pursue their economic
objectives in conjunction with an organization which also represents
bona fide employees. 59 It follows that if medical practitioners who are
Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252 (1955);
Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CH. L.
REv. 659 (1965); Smith, Antitrust and Labor, 53 MICH. L. REv. 1119 (1955); Winter,
Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to
Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963); Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemption, 55
CALIF. L. REv. 254 (1967).
155. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted); see Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 825 (1945).
156. Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Local 3, 325 U.S. 797, 808 (1945); see United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664-66 (1965).
157. See American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 534-36 (1943);
Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942); New Negro Alliance V.
Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
158. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485,
157. See American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 534-36 (1943);
159. See, e.g., Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371
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truly independent entrepreneurs were to unite for the purpose of bene-
fiting their personal business interests through price-fixing or other con-
certed activities, they would be unable to avail themselves of the protec-
tion provided by the labor exemption. On the other hand, it should also
be clear that legitimate concerted activities undertaken by a physician
organization which actually represents employee-doctors who have a
bona fide employment relationship with a health care institution or
some other employer would be substantially immunized from Sherman
Act liability under the rationale of the labor exemption.
In light of the pervasive strands of control which are becoming
more frequently a characteristic of the relationship between a health care
facility and its staff physicians, 160 it would certainly not be unrealistic to
regard the connection as an employment relationship rather than as an
independent contractor relationship.161 If this course were followed, the
labor exemption might reasonably be applicable to concerted action
undertaken by such doctors in an effort legitimately to enhance the
terms or conditions of employment inherent in that relationship. On the
other hand, coordinated activities motivated by a desire to advance
personal business interests not meaningfully related to the employment
relationship existing between such staff physicians and the employing
institution would not fall within the purview of the labor exemption,
because the requisite connection to a labor dispute would be lacking.
1 62
It was noted earlier that for labor relations purposes, medical
practioners are realistically viewed as independent contractors, rather
than as employees, in their customary relationship with insurance car-
riers, which merely reimburse the doctors for services they provide to
insured patients."6 3 This conclusion might initially appear to preclude
U.S. 94 (1962); Taylor v. Horseshoers Local 7, 353 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 969 (1966); United States v. Olympia Provision & Baking Co., 282 F.
Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 480 (1969).
160. See notes 67-78 & accompanying text supra. See text accompanying notes 2-28
supra.
161. See notes 47-78 & accompanying text supra.
162. See text accompanying notes 157-58 supra. "[B]y the terms of the statute
[Norris-La Guardia Act] there may be a 'labor dispute" where the disputants do not
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. But the statutory classifica-
tion, however broad, of parties and circumstances to which a 'labor dispute' may relate
does not expand the application of the Act to include controversies upon which the
employer-employee relationship has no bearing." Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hin-
ton, 315 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1942) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). See Connell
Construction Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 100, 43 U.S.L.W. 4657 (June 2,
1975).
163. See note 49 supra.
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application of the labor exemption to all concerted activities used by
organized doctors to affect the economic interests of physicians vis-A-vis
such insurance companies. Nevertheless, such a presumption should
not be too readily accepted.
In Local 24, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Oliver,""
the Supreme Court recognized the appropriateness of a collective bar-
gaining agreement negotiated by the Teamsters Union which specifically
defined the rental schedules applicable to owner-drivers of trucking
equipment, " ' despite the fact that such owner-drivers were independent
businessmen who did not constitute employees within the meaning of
the NLRA. Since the Teamsters Union represented employee-drivers
who were employed to operate trucking equipment owned by their
employers, the Court determined that the objective of the union in
negotiating the rental fee schedule which applied to the independent
owner-drivers was to protect the collectively bargained wage scale of the
employee-drivers against possible undermining through a diminution of
rental fees charged by owner-drivers. The Court concluded that the
negotiated provisions did not embody a "remote and indirect approach
to the subject of wages," but rather constituted "a direct frontal attack
upon a problem thought to threaten the maintenance of the basic wage
structure established by the collective bargaining contract."'u 6
The rationale of the Oliver decision' 1 7 was reiterated by the Su-
preme Court in American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll,' where-
in the Court rejected a federal antitrust challenge to the musicians
union practice of establishing and enforcing minimum price schedules
which were applied to contractual arrangements undertaken by inde-
pendent orchestra leaders.' 69 Although the independent orchestra lead-
ers were considered to be businessmen rather than employees, the
Court determined that they constituted a labor group and were parties
164. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
165. "Owner-drivers" are individuals who own trucking equipment which they lease
to companies on a fee basis. The fee covers the rental of the equipment, labor services
provided by the owner-driver, and a profit margin for the owner-driver. See id. at 286-87.
166. 358 U.S. at 294.
167. Although the Oliver decision directly concerned the question of whether a state
could, consistent with the federal preemption doctrine, apply its antitrust law to the
activities in issue, the reasoning of the Supreme Court clearly would have precluded
Sherman Act liability in that case owing to the applicability of the labor exemption.
168. 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
169. The musicians' union effectuated its price scheme by requiring the orchestra
leaders to become union members as a prerequisite to their working with musicians'
union sidemen. The requirement subjected the leaders to internal union discipline if they
failed to comply with the prescribed price regulations. See id. at 102-05.
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to a labor dispute, owing to the presence of direct job and wage com-
petition between them and the employee-members of the musicians
union. The Court concluded that the labor exempton was applicable.
While the opinion recognized that the union regulations technically af-
fected "prices," rather than "wages," the Court cautioned against exalt-
ing form over substance, emphasizing that "the crucial determinant is
not the form of the agreement-e.g., prices or wages-but its relative
impact on the product market and the interests of the [employed]
union members."17 The Court further indicated that the critical in-
quiry in cases such as Carroll and Oliver is whether the price schedules
or other restrictions imposed upon the independent contractors in ac-
tuality operate to protect the wages or other substantial and legitimate
interests of the employee-members of the union involvedY.
7 1
In the immediate future, there will be increasing pressure for the
establishment and proliferation of institutions such as health mainte-
nance organizations' 72 which will involve the actual employment of
many staff physicians. The ability of such enterprises to operate success-
fully will be essentially dependent upon their capacity to provide
medical protection which the general public perceives as being financial-
ly preferable to the utilization of doctors and hospitals on an ad hoc
basis. Therefore, if a physician union were to endeavor effectively to
enhance the compensation levels and working conditions of the staff
doctors employed by such group health entities, it might well be affected
by direct competition from independent contractor doctors who accept
each case on a fee-for-service basis. 73 It would then be reasonable to
argue that efforts by a physician union to regulate the fee schedules of
independent contractor practitioners should be protected by the labor
exemption in appropriate cases as "a direct frontal attack upon a
problem thought to threaten the maintenance of the basic wage struc-
ture" negotiated for doctors employed by group health enterprises,
even though such an arrangement would likely increase the financial
170. 391 U.S. at 107; see Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,
690 n.5 (1965).
171. 391 U.S. at 108.
172. See notes 14-20 & accompanying text supra.
173. Two forms of competition would exist between independent contractor physi-
cians and doctors employed by group health enterprises: (1) direct wage competition
similar to that present in Oliver and Carroll which could significantly affect the
compensation levels that the union could reasonably demand for its employee-members
and (2) job competition based on the ability of independent contractor-doctors to reduce
their fee schedules as a means of encouraging patients of group health programs to reject
those plans and return to traditional practitioners.
September 19751
burden of health insurance carriers which reimburse such independent
doctors for their services.' 74
Since the establishment of any artificial fee schedules for independ-
ent practitioners would certainly have some detrimental impact upon the
general public, the scope of the Oliver-Carroll exemption as applied to
organized employee-physicians should be reasonably narrow. The physi-
cian organization endeavoring to use the protection afforded by the
labor exemption should be required to demonstrate that the independent
practitioners whose fee schedules are being affected are truly competing
with the employee-physicians in such a direct manner that a diminish-
ment of their fee schedules would be likely to threaten the compensation
levels or job security of the employee-doctors involved." 75 Without such
proof, price-fixing attempts should not be accorded labor exemption
protection, since they would actually involve only a "remote and indirect
approach to the subject of wages.' 78  Although this approach would
impose a tangible burden upon a physician organization which de-
sired to avail itself of the antitrust immunity provided by the labor
exemption, it would at least permit such a union to enjoy some protection
when it truly acted to enhance the direct and legitimate interests of its
employee-members, and it would simultaneously prevent unnecessarily
pervasive price-fixing schemes which would be injurious to the public
interest. 77
174. See text accompanying note 166 supra. The labor exemption would not
immunize concerted fee-fixing arrangements involving staff doctors who are not yet
being compensated by the institution which exercises sufficient control over the physi-
cians to create a limited employment relationship (see notes 76-79 supra), but who are
instead remunerated through their own direct billing of patients, since such fee-fixing
activities would not be sufficiently related to the employment relationship in question to
warrant protection.
175. This conclusion presumes, of course, that the organized employee-physicians
are using legitimate means to accomplish their objective. The use of internal union
regulations which would preclude union members from dealing with independent practi-
tioners who are in direct competition with employed physicians and who do not observe
the union-established fee schedules should be regarded as appropriate primary conduct
similar to that utilized in Carroll. Furthermore, it would not be unreasonable to allow a
physician union to negotiate directly either with those independent practitioners who
threaten the compensation levels or job security of employee-doctors or with the
insurance entities which remunerate such practitioners for their services, in an effort to
obtain a satisfactory fee-schedule agreement. Resort to bona fide "strike" activities
against such parties during negotiations might similarly be accorded labor exemption
protection.
176. See text accompanying note 166 supra.
177. This suggested approach would constitute an extension of the Oliver-Carroll
rationale, since it would permit a physician organization to affect parties who do not
ordinarily have direct dealings with employee-members of the union. In Oliver, the
challenged arrangement had been directly negotiated with the company which employed
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Relevant Cartwright Act Exemptions
Activities of a physician organization which unreasonably restrain
trade within California are subject to the substantive coverage of the
Cartwright act.17 8 Unless the doctors involved in such concerted conduct
can avail themselves of the protection afforded by one of the recognized
exemptions from the California antitrust statute,1 79 they can be subject-
ed to substantial liability.
"Professions" Exemption
In Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hospital Association,8 0 the
California Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Cartwright Act
are inapplicable to restraints involving the medical profession. The court
noted that the language describing the types of combinations made
unlawful by the Cartwright Act does not include the term "profes-
sion." 181 The court thought it significant that section 16600 of the
Business and Professions Code, rendering void those contracts which
restrain persons from engaging in "a lawful profession, trade or business
of any kind," specifically included the term "profession," notwithstand-
ing the use of the words "trade" and business," even though the provision
was enacted at the same time as the Cartwright Act.'3 2 The Court thus
the union drivers threatened by the activities of the independent owner-drivers, and in
Carroll, the orchestra leaders who were affected by the union scheme directly employed
union sidemen. Such direct connecting strands would usually not be present between
independent practitioners and a bona fide physicians' union.
178. See text accompanying notes 96-118 supra.
179. It should be noted that were a bona fide physician union to engage in activity
which might constitute a substantive violation of the Cartwright Act, but which is also
regulated by the provisions of the NLRA, the federal preemption doctrine would pre-
clude application of the California antitrust law. See Connell Construction Co. v. Plumb-
ers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 43 U.S.LW. 4657, 4663 (June 2, 1975);
Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348
U.S. 468 (1955). Under such circumstances, only reliance upon the federal antitrust
statutes would be possible. With respect to those endeavors not within the jurisdictional
purview of the NLRA, however, the exercise of state antitrust authority would not be
inappropriate. See 43 U.S.L.W. at 4663.
180. 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1962).
181. Id. at 809, 376 P.2d at 569, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 641. The court indicated that
while there had been cases giving the statutory language a rather broad interpretation to
include restraints involving such services as barbering (Messner v. Barbers Union, 53
Cal. 2d 873, 886, 351 P.2d 347, 355, 4 Cal. Rptr. 179, 187 (1960)) and maintenance
work (People v. Building Maintenance Contractors Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 719, 723, 264 P.2d
31, 34 (1953)), there had been no California decisions bringing the professions within
the coverage of the Cartwright Act, 58 Cal. 2d at 809, 376 P.2d at 570, 26 Cal. Rptr. at
642.
182. 58 Cal. 2d at 809, 376 P.2d at 570, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
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decided that the difference in terminology between section 16600 and
the Cartwright Act could reasonably be viewed as indicating that the
latter enactment was not intended to apply to the professions, and it
noted that "antitrust legislation providing for treble damages should not
be applied to the professions unless the language clearly calls for such an
application." 183 It therefore concluded that the language of the Cart-
wright Act did not mandate such applicability to restraints involving the
medical profession.'
Although the Willis decision appears to indicate that a physician
organization would not be subject to Cartwright Act laibility for any
restrictions it might impose upon the medical profession itself, it does
not necessarily mean that concerted conduct by physicians which signi-
ficantly affects insurance carriers would be so insulated. A restraint
imposed upon the business of insurance may fall within the purview of
the Cartwright Act." 5 Since the type of trust prohibited by the Cart-
wright Act includes activity involving "two or more persons,"'8 6 a
California court might reasonably analogize a restraint by the medical
profession which affected the insurance business to the situation consid-
ered by the United States Supreme Court in American Medical Associa-
tion v. United States,187 in which the practice of group health services
was the target of the medical practitioner's restraint. A California court
could thus find an illegal restraint by physicians in violation of the
Cartwright Act, based upon the premise that the status of the defendants
is irrelevant, so long as their combined activities directly affect some
non-medical business' 88 which constitutes trade or commerce within the
183. Id.
184. Id.; see Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons v. California Medical Ass'n, 224
Cal. App. 2d 378, 36 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1964), in which the court similarly determined that
the Cartwright Act did not apply to restraints involving the practice of medicine.
185. See Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 172 P.2d 867
(1946).
186. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (West 1964) (emphasis added).
187. 317 U.S. 519 (1943). See note 148 supra.
188. In Tatkin v. Superior Ct., 160 Cal. App. 2d 745, 757-65, 326 P.2d 201, 208-13
(1958), the appellate court indicated the belief that physicians who conspire to restrain
the practice of medicine could be held liable under common law restraint of trade
principles, regardless of whether the Cartwright Act would apply to such circumstances.
Nevertheless, since the Cartwright Act was legislatively intended to codify the common
law rules pertaining to restraints upon trade (see note 98 supra), it would be entirely
incongruous for a court to recognize that a restraint upon the medical profession is not
cognizable under the Cartwright Act, while simultaneously imposing liability for such
conduct under purported common law principles. Such judicial action would constitute an
unwarranted circumvention of the legislative intent evidenced by the exclusion of the
professions from the coverage of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE section 16720. See notes 182-
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meaning of section 16720(a). Under such circumstances, the defend-
ants would be forced to seek protection in another exemption.
The Labor Exemption
Section 16703 of the California Business and Professions Code
specifically provides that "labor, whether skilled or unskilled, is not a
commodity" within the meaning of the Cartwright Act. This provision
has been interpreted as providing bona fide labor organizations with
an immunity from California antitrust legislation analogous to that
available under the federal labor exemption.
1 8 9
Although the California labor exemption does not protect a labor
union from Cartwright Act liability if it combines with nonlabor groups
to effectuate an improper restraint of trade,190 the California Supreme
Court has held that a union may legitimately impose unilateral restraints
which affect independent businessmen when such restrictions are rea-
sonably necessary to protect the wages and working conditions of em-
ployee-members of that union from the deleterious effects caused by
direct competition between the independent entrepreneurs and the em-
ployee-members.191 Thus, the principles previously discussed with re-
spect to the Oliver-Carroll corollary to the federal labor exemption
92
should be applicable to the California labor exemption through a rea-
sonable extrapolation of the theories enunciated by the California Su-
preme Court. For this reason, a physician organization should be per-
mitted to endeavor by legal means' 93 to impose restraints upon
84 & accompanying text supra. Furthermore, since the definitive decisions in Willis and
Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons were rendered subsequent to the Tatkin decision, it is
most probable that the belief which was only parenthetically and gratuitously discussed
in Talkrn would not be applied in the future.
189. See, e.g., Schweizer v. Local Joint Executive Board, 121 Cal. App. 2d 45, 262
P.2d 568 (1953); Riviello v. Barbers Union, 88 Cal. App. 2d 499, 199 P.2d 400 (1948).
190. See, e.g., Overland Publishing Co. v. H.S. Crocker Co., 193 Cal. 109, 117-18,
222 P. 812, 815-16 (1924).
191. See, e.g., Messner v. Barbers Union, 53 Cal. 2d 873, 885-87, 351 P.2d 347,
354-56, 4 Cal. Rptr. 179, 186-88 (1960); Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 749-51, 155
P.2d 343, 345-46 (1944).
192. See notes 164-77 & accompanying text supra.
193. See note 175 supra. Courts have suggested that California common law
principles relating to unlawful interference with a business, trade, or occupation may
impose liability upon medical associations and their physician-members, even when their
interference affects only the practice of medicine, if improper or unjustified business
techniques are used. See Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n, 58 Cal. 2d 806,
810, 376 P.2d 568, 570, 26 Cal. Rptr. 640, 642 (1962); Osteopathic Physicians &
Surgeons v. California Medical Ass'n, 224 Cal. App. 2d 378, 396, 36 Cal. Rptr. 641, 652
(1964). In Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 P. 1027 (1908),
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independent practitioners who are demonstrably competing with the
employee-doctors represented by that organization in such a reasonably
direct manner that their fee schedules are likely to threaten the compen-
sation levels or job security of the employee-physicians involved. 94
Conclusion
In recent years, the health care industry has undergone significant
changes, and this process will undoubtedly continue in the future. The
once wholly independent physicians are being subjected to increasing
control exercised by the medical facilities where they perform their
professional services and the large insurance carriers which remunerate
them for the vast majority of their work. The strong impetus, both
legislative and social, for the establishment of complete health care
centers which can supply total medical services on a set fee, prepayment
basis, will eventually result in the actual employment of many doctors on
a regular salaried basis.
Individual physicians are incapable of effectively dealing with the
well organized insurance and health care entities which increasingly
affect their professional lives. As a result, many practitioners are organ-
izing labor unions and associations which they hope can represent their
interests. If anachronistic legal doctrines are perfunctorily applied to
such organizations, however, the doctors will be unfairly disenfran-
chised. It is time for courts to recognize the fact that contemporary
realities necessitate the reconsideration of traditional theories and, in
some cases, the development of somewhat novel concepts.
When health care institutions exercise significant control over the
professional work performed by their staff physicians, it should be
recognized that employment, rather than independent contractor, rela-
tionships are involved. This view would permit physician organizations
to represent employee-doctors under the protections afforded by appli-
cable labor relations legislation. To the extent such organizations engage
in legitimate concerted activities intended to protect their employee-
however, the California Supreme Court indicated that when organized labor engages in
legitimate activities pertaining to the protection of some bona fide employment relation-
ship, they are not liable under common law interference theories. To the extent that the
modest proposals contained in this article are accepted regarding the applicability of the
California and federal labor exemptions to reasonable conduct undertaken by physician
unions to protect their employee-members from the adverse effects which might be
caused by direct competition with independent practitioners, those organizations and
their physician-members should similarly be considered immune from liability under
common law business interference doctrines.
194. See notes 172-77 & accompanying text supra.
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members from the deleterious effects of direct competition with inde-
pendent practitioners, such conduct, even when it effectively regulates
the fee schedules or other aspects of the individual practitioners' work,
should be exempt from California or federal antitrust liability through
application of the labor exemption. Such a result would do no more than
provide employee-physicians with rights commensurate with those al-
ready enjoyed by other workers. Anything less would constitute invidi-
ous discrimination based solely upon the currently exalted economic
status of physicians.

